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Abstract. In this article, we investigate the link between the duration of bank relationships 
and its consequences on the performance of Tunisian firms. Performance is measured by the 
return on equity (ROE) and the return on Assets (ROA). We collected data of 100 Tunisian 
companies for the period of 2000-2007. Applying panel data estimation, our results opine that 
the cost of credit decreases the performance of Tunisian firms while the duration of bank 
relationships improves their performance and increase their profitability. 
 
Key words. Duration, Bank-relationship, Performance, Tunisia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 A short draft of this paper was published as The duration of relationship banking and the performance of 
Tunisian firms: an empirical test in the Journal of Applied Business Research 01/2014. Vol. 30.2014, 1, p 59-64 
2 
 
I. Introduction 
Modern literature on financial intermediation provides support for the importance of bank 
relationship in financing small business. First, there is no unique definition of the term 
relationship banking. According to Boot (2000) relationship banking is defined as the 
provision of financial services by a financial intermediary that: invests in obtaining customer-
specific information, often proprietary in nature; and evaluates the profitability of these 
investments through multiple interactions with the same customer over time and/or across 
products.                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Nowadays, the relationship between banks and enterprises is becoming ever more significant 
for two reasons. Firstly, banks are the principal channel of financing firms. Secondly, firms 
became one of the major accelerators of the economic development by creating employment 
and contributing to the economic growth. As a result, banks and firms became among the 
most important institutions of the economy and thus, their relationships should be strong in 
order to ensure the safety of the economic system as a whole because the failure of the former 
or the later could generate an economic disaster (Hamdi et al 2012).  
In the literature, several theoretical and empirical studies focused on the nature of bank 
relationships (determinants of the relationships, costs and availability of credits, etc) whereas 
there are few studies that treat the duration of the bank enterprise relationship. A lot of 
importance is attached to this issue to understand why the lending contract lengths several 
years for a company and only some months or years for some others. Broadly, based to its 
borrower, the firm determines the duration it wants.  
The duration of the lending contract constitutes one of the principal components of the bank-
enterprise relationships and it is is a significant measure of the solidity of the banking 
relationship. Like the dimension of the number of relationships, the duration can influence the 
negotiation of credit conditions and consequently the performance of the firms.  The duration 
of the banking relation is differed from a system to another and its dimension varies from one 
country to another one. In Germany, the average duration of the bank-firm relationship is 20 
years (Elsas and Krahnen, 1998). The estimates for Sweden are for over 20 years (Sjogren, 
1994) and 14 years in Italy (Angelini, Di Salvo and Ferri, 1998). In Japan, the duration varies 
between 21 and 30 years (Horiuchi, Parker and Fakuda 1998) and in the United States it is 
around 7 years ((Petersen and Rajan, 1995, Blackwell and Winters, 1997; Cole 1998) and for 
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nine years in Finland (Peltoniemi, 2007). Why the duration of the banking relationships varies 
from a country to another?  What are the benefits of long lending contract duration and what 
are their drawbacks? 
Broadly, the duration reflects the degree of relationship intensity over time. Some studies 
show that the long duration allows enterprises to benefit from competitive interest rates and 
high degree of availability the credits during financial instability. Berger and Udell (1995), 
Blackwell and Winters (1997) and Bodenhorn (2003) find a significantly positive impact on 
loan rates for US SMEs. In the Finnish study, Peltoniemi (2007) also finds similar results. 
Harhoff and Körting (1998) and Eber (2001) show that a long duration reduces the problem 
of asymmetry of information. The repetitive character in the time of these relations makes it 
possible for the two parts to collect the maximum of necessary information what reduces the 
problem of asymmetry information origin of the credit rationing.  In the same way, the long 
term relations support the availability of credit at a lower cost (Peterson and Rajan (1994), 
Angelini et al. (1998)). 
The long duration of bank relationships has some drawbacks according to Degryse and Van 
Cayseele (2000), Lehmann and Neuberger (2001) and Hernandez-Canavas and Martinez-
Solano. Authors show that the long duration will lead to soft budget constraints problem 
which refers to a situation by which an economic entity expects to obtain a bailout during a 
period financial trouble Korani (1980). According to the soft budget constraints, a borrower 
can request additional funds from the lender but the later can refuse this request.  
Another concern raising from long duration is the hold-up problem (Greenbaum and Al 
(1989), Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992), Von Thadden (1998. During the time, the lending 
relationships generate a lock-in problem given that banks will have the monopoly power over 
the customer. In same line of analysis, when the duration of the lending contract lengthens, 
banks endogenously gain an information monopoly and are able to extract additional rents 
from their clients. Those problems may generate some costs for the borrowing firms which 
usually affect the credit amount and loan covenants. 
Following this development, we distinguish an ambiguity according to the advantages and 
disadvantages from each type of relationship (short and long).  So the performance of the 
firms can be influenced by the benefits and the costs of the duration of a bank relationship.  
The aim of this paper is to test empirically the effect of the duration of bank relationships 
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(long term) on the performance of the Tunisian SMEs. Our sample is based on 100 firms 
observed during the period 200-2007. The empirical study is based on panel data analysis 
with fixed effect regression. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows: the second section gives a literature review on the 
bank relationship as well as a cost advantage analysis of the duration of the lending contract 
between a borrower and a lender. This section allows us to formulate our hypothesis. The 
section three is the empirical part of this paper which gives information of the data collection, 
the econometric methodology and discusses the results and section 4 concludes.  
 
II.  Bank relationships and firms performance:  the literature review 
According to the available studies, we may summarize the literature on the bank-firm 
relationships in three axes:  
- The first axe analyses the number of bank relationships and its impacts on the 
performance of the firms. The major issues were studied by Bhattacharya and Chiesa 
(1995), von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (1998), Shepard (1987), Farrell and Gallini (1988), 
Petersen and Rajan (1997), Djelassi et al (2011a,b). Results of the first axe are not 
unanimous. While some authors have found a positive relationship between multiple 
bank relationships and performance of firms, some others recommend the single bank 
relationships. 
- The second axe investigates the bank-firm relationships and the cost of credits (Bolton 
and Scharfstein (1996), Detragiache and al.(1997) Blackwell, and Winters (1997), 
Hamdi et al (2012)). Overall results show that young firms and start-up suffer more 
from credit rationing rather than old companies. Fama (1985) argues that banks are 
inside lenders and as insiders they have access to some private information about the 
borrowers that is not available to outside lenders who purchase publicly traded debt. 
(Elyasiani and Goldberg 2004). In case that the bank has incomplete information 
(imperfect information), and restricted control over the borrowers actions (incentive 
effect), it will use collaterals or guaranties as an approach to limit the risk of default and 
increase the return (Berger and Udell 1998). Consequently, the cost of credit increase. 
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Generally large firms are more transparent than small firms because small businesses 
are relatively opaque with respect to providing the necessary information in the loan 
process (Stieglitz and Weiss, 1981) 
- The third axe examines the impact of the bank-firm relationship on the availability of 
loans during the periods of boom and bust (Agelini, Di Salvo and Ferri (1998) and Cole, 
R (1998) D’Auria, Foglia and Reedtz 1999, Hamdi et al (2012)). The main results 
suggest that availability of credits is closely linked to the financial historical statement 
of the firms as well as the size of the company. In periods of political and financial 
instability, lending activities are very restricted and credits are available for companies 
with strong financial statement only. 
Despite the abundant literature on the bank enterprise relationships, fewer are the articles 
which empirically focus on the importance of the duration of the relationships between the 
two institutions. To the best of our knowledge, there is no article analyzing the duration of 
bank firm relationship for an emerging economy. Hence, the aim of this section is to develops 
this axis and to analyses the costs and advantageous of a long/short term duration of a bank-
firm relationship. 
1. Advantages of long term bank relationships 
A long term bank enterprise relationship is considered as a repetition of lending contracts for 
several years and it aims at financing investments and projects of borrowers when they need 
funds. The bank and the enterprise can decide on the length of their contract. A firm can 
decide to shorten the duration or to change from one lender to another one or switch from 
multiple bank relationships when credit is not available by its bank or when the cost of funds 
is unaffordable. In the other hand, a bank can decide to stop financing a firm when the later is 
considered as riskier or when its financial statement is ambiguous. A bank cans also cut-off 
the contract with the borrower when the later did not provide the information required by the 
lender. Information about borrowers is fundamentally important to the lending process. Low 
asymmetric information leads to low cost of monitoring, low interest rates and low charges. 
In the other hand, high asymmetric information leads to high charges (interest rate, collateral 
and guaranties) and to a credit rationing which will limit the availability of credit. 
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According to Eber (2001), the long term bank relationship offers several advantages to the 
companies which in turn contribute to the improvement of their performances. A long 
duration reduces the cost of lending and hence the probability of credit rationing will also be 
reduced (Fried and Howitt 1980) and Okun (1981). The repetitive lending contracts over the 
time allow the two parts to get gradual information about each other. According to Boot 
(2000), the long term banking relationship facilitates the exchange of information between the 
two institutions and hence increases the transparency. Onega and smith (2001) opine that the 
repeated provision of bank services through time may reveal valuable private information 
about the customer to the bank which will make the credit process faster and easier. In the 
same way of analysis, Harhöff and Körting (1998) show that the long term relationship 
reduce the problems of asymmetric information which in turn will reduce requirements of the 
guarantees necessary to obtain the credit. In this case, the firms profit from an access 
facilitated to the credit with less low interest rates owing as result as the monitoring and 
control costs decrease when the company weaves long term relations. The model of Boot and 
Thakor (1994) predicts that, as a relationship matures, interest rates decline and collateral 
requirements fall. Berger and Udell (1995) find that the interest rate charged and collateral 
pledged on lines of credit is decreasing in the length of a firm’s relationship with its bank. 
The firm may want to borrow from the same bank again because repeated borrowing gives 
the bank an opportunity to efficiently tax and subsidize it over time in order to reduce the use 
of (costly) collateral (Boot and Thakor (1994)).  Peterson and Rajan (1994) concluded that the 
duration of the bank-firm relationship is central for accessibility and availability of credit 
what makes it possible to support the investment of the firms.  Once the investment is 
stimulated, the performance of the firms improves 
This literature also suggests that longer relationships generally improve credit availability 
(Berger & Udell, 1995; Petersen & Rajan, 1994). The bank is better positioned to enforce 
compliance with the terms of the new loan because of the information on the firm it has 
already learned. Haubrich (1989)). Angelini et al. (1998) show that the survival of the long 
term relationship must be rewarded by a payment for the less raised interest rates and by a 
privilege of accessibility to the credit. This will be reflected positively on the firm 
performance following a reduction of the financial expenses.  The relations of long term 
present a flexible character in opposition to the rigidity of the strictly structural engagements 
subscribed on the financial market.   
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According to these perceptions, the long duration of bank relationships minimizes the 
motivation of firms to switch banks or initiate multiple relationships as the costs of credit is 
affordable and funds are availability during harsh periods. Hence, we can suggest our first 
hypothesis which is 
H1: the duration of the banking relation improves the performance of the firms.   
2.  Costs of a long term bank-firm relationship 
While some authors recommend the long term bank relationships many other support the 
short duration of lending contracts. Literature provides two principal costs of relationship 
lending which are the soft budget constraint problem and the informational capture problem 
(hold-up).  
The concept of the soft budget constraint was initially introduced by Kornai (1979) to 
illustrate the performance of socialist economies. Precisely, Kornai cites government 
paternalism and high social and political costs of worker layoffs.  Broadly, the soft budget 
constraint refers to a situation by which an economic entity expects to obtain a bailout during 
a period financial trouble. During the past decade, a sizable literature has accumulated 
explaining the causes and consequences of the soft budget constraint and recently, this 
concept has been applied to phenomena in market economies as well (Du and Li 2004). The 
growing literature on soft budget constraint (SBC) has mainly focused on the SBC on 
enterprises (Maskin, 1996, 1999; Maskin and Xu, 2001; Kornai, Maskin, and Roland, 2003). 
The current modern idea of the SBC theories almost suggests that banks serve as rescuers for 
enterprises that are on the border of bankruptcy (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1994; Berglof and Roland, 1998). In this case banks have usually the superior power 
and they are considered as the only decision-makers of the future of their clients enterprises. 
Some authors argue that the soft budget constraint constitutes a serious problem for 
enterprises which have a long duration of bank relationship because their survival is related to 
their banks. If a bank refuses subsidizing a fragile enterprise, the later will fails. 
The second problem related to the long run duration is the monopoly power for the banks 
with regards to the information held of their clients. This can giving rise to a hold-up problem 
(Ongena and Smith, 2001). In fact, with repetitive lending contracts with their clients, banks 
collect information permanently and revise their evaluations of firm credit worthiness. 
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Information is gathered through repeat lending or the provision of deposit and other 
information-intensive financial services (Boot 2000)  
Some empirical literature shows the drawbacks of long banking duration. For example 
Blackwell and Santomero (1982) argue that long-term relationships may not lead to 
privileged behavior by banks. In an instable period, banks did not distinguish between an old 
client and a new one. The most important thing for banks is the guaranties provides by their 
customers in trouble periods as well as their solid wealth. If an enterprise with long bank 
duration appears in fragile situation, the bank automatically refuses financing its consumer to 
avoid and minimize the risk of credit. Petersen and Rajan (1994) investigate credit costs and 
loan availability to more than 3,000 small businesses in the US and their findings did not 
suggest any positive relationship between the duration of bank-borrower relationships and the 
cost of credit. Similarly Blackwell and Winters (1997) find no statistical relationship between 
relationship duration and credit costs. For the German context, the study of Harhoff and 
Körting (1998) fails to reveal any significant correlation between relationship duration and 
credit costs.  
In their studies, Greenbaum et al 1989; Rajan, 1992; Sharpe, 1990; Wilson, 1993 demonstrate 
that interest rates will raise as the relationship get longer since lenders finance the borrowers 
initially but will be reimbursed with higher rates later. Degryse and van Cayseele (2000), 
studying a sample of European banks, find that the terms of the contract deteriorate with the 
duration of the relationship. In another study, the authors (Degryse and van Cayseele 2000) 
find that the loan rate increases with the duration of the relationship.  The same conclusion 
was found by Angelini et al. (1998) for the Italian context. Authors show that loan rates tend 
to increase with the length of relationship. 
According to what is cited above, we can suggest a second hypothesis to be tested in the 
second section of the paper which is:  
H2:   The duration of the banking relation deteriorates the performance of the firms.   
III. Empirical analysis  
1. Data and model specification 
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Our study is based on data collected from 100 Tunisian companies of different size and 
operating in various sectors for the period 2000-2007. Regarding quantitative variables we 
use the firm’s financial statements (balance sheets and income statements). In the other hand, 
qualitative data were obtained following a distribution of a questionnaire
2
. 
 The performance of the firms is measured by the return on equity (ROE) and the return on 
assets (ROA). The estimation method is based on panel data technique and the econometric 
equation is written as follows: 
  ROA = α0 + β1SIZE i, t + β2 AGE i, t + β3 SECT+ β4 COST + β5 RAT i, t   +   β6  MLTPL i, t + β7 
NBANK + β8 DUR + ε i                                                                                                                          (1) 
 ROE = α0 + β1SIZE i, t + β2 AGE i, t + β3 SECT+ β4 COST + β5 RATi,t                                          
+   β6  MLTPL i, t + β7 NBANK + β8 DUR + ε i                                                                    (2)         
Where  
ROA and ROE: they measure the performance of the firms;  
DUR: the duration of bank relationships measured by the number of years the both parties are 
partners,  
COST:  refers to the cost of credit; 
 Age: is the age of the firm (date of creation to the date of the collected data),   
SIZE: is the size of the firm measured by the natural logarithm of total assets,  
MLTPL: is a dummy variable reflecting the multiplicity of relationships, it takes 1 if the 
company is financed by more than one bank and 0 otherwise, 
NBank: is the number of banks financing the company, 
 RAT: is a dummy variable of credit rationing it takes the value of 1 if the amount of future 
credit granted is constant or has increased and 0 if the amount of credit decreases. 
SECT:  is a dummy variable reflecting the sector of activity; it takes the value of 1 if the firm 
operates in the industry and 2 otherwise. 
 
2. The Results 
                                                          
2
 Questionnaire was send to 187 firms, only 100 of them have responded (53.47%). Sectors include 
manufacturing, service and trade only. 
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According to the table 1 below, the average return on assets is 2.81% and the average return 
on equity is 5.13%. Companies built their bank relationships that last 8.97 years on average. 
The number of bank relationships varies between one and two (1.74). This low number of 
bank partners is associated with an average of 41.10% of multiple banking. The average age 
of this sample is 9 years and the average cost of credit for these companies is 8.3% with a 
minimum of 5.75% and a maximum of 11.8%. The table 2 below illustrates the degree of 
correlation between the different variables of the study. 
Table 1. Descriptives Statistics 
Variables Nbr  of 
obs. 
Mean std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
Roa 800 0.0281 0.0054 0 .0051 0.05 
Roe 800 0.0513 0.0081 0.0245 0.075 
Dur 800 8.970 4.688 0 26 
Mltpl 800 0.411 0.492 0 4 
Nbank 800 1.740 1.015 1 1 
Size 800 0.965 0.6058 -0.1815 2.185 
age 800 9.045 4.671 0 26 
Sect 800 0.5875 0.4925 0 1 
Rat 800 0.231 0.4218 0 1 
Cost 800 0.083 0.0111 0.0575 0.118 
 
This matrix shows that the correlation between different variables is very low
3
; implying the 
absence of multicollinearity between different variables of our estimation. 
Table 2. The  correlation Matrix 
 Roa Roe Dur Mltpl Nbank Size Age  Sect Rat Cost 
Roa 1          
Roe 0.678 1         
Dur 0.028 0.0042 1        
Mltpl -0.026 -0.0244 0.1013 1       
Nbank -0.027 -0.0181 0.0612 0.1675 1      
Size 0.487 0.3340 0.0059 0.2531 0.2462 1     
Age  0.031 0.0063 0.3874 0.0877 0.0494 0.0047 1    
Sect -0.037 -0.0457 0.0488 -0.073 -0.102 -0.177 0.0233 1   
Rat -0.045 -0.0616 -0.1028 -0.229 -0.213 -0.076 -0.097 0.0019 1  
Cost -0.025 -0.0221 -0.3919 -0.009 0.0194 0.0432 -0.390 0.0008 0.0242 1 
 
                                                          
3
 Except for Size/ROA and Age/DUR 
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The results of various tests are provided in the table 3 below. The Chow test is significant; in 
addition, the Breush Pagan (LM) statistic test and the Hausman test are significant at 1%. 
According to Hausman test we apply the fixed effects specification for the model. 
Table 3. Results of the fixed effect estimation 
Explanatory variables  Model 1 
(Return on Assets = ROA), (FE) 
Model 2 
(Return on Equity = ROE), (FE) 
Coefficients (z- statistic) Coefficients (z- statistic) 
Dur 0.0001*** 
(0.000) 
8.12 0.0012*** 
(0.000) 
2.61 
Mltpl -0.0007 
(0.244) 
-1.17 -0.0003*** 
(0.000) 
-3.26 
Nbank -0.0005* 
(0.089) 
-1.73 -0.0005 
(0.425) 
-0.80 
Size 0.0116 *** 
(0.000) 
33.58 0.0115*** 
(0.000) 
16.50 
Age 0.0002*** 
(0.000) 
9.21 0.0008 
(0.66) 
0.44 
Sect -0.00005 
(0.972) 
-0.03 -0.0010 
(0.725) 
-0.35 
Rat -0.0004 
(0.268) 
-1.11 -0.0006* 
(0.089) 
-.179 
Cost -0.0400 ** 
(0.025) 
-2.25 -0.052 
(0.149) 
-1.44 
R²w 0.6271 0.2904 
R²b 0.0505 0.0154 
Fisher Test 
Prob > F 
12.35*** 
(0.000) 
 
9.89 
(0.000) 
 
Hausman 
Prob>chi2 
1401.29*** 
(0.000) 
137.05*** 
(0.000) 
Breusch-Pagan (LM) 
Prob > chi2 
91.07*** 
(0.0000) 
28.01*** 
(0.000) 
Number of observations 800 800 
 
The results show that the duration, the age and the size have a positive and a significant 
correlation with the firm’s performance indicators (ROA and ROE). The variables NBank and 
Cost act negatively and significantly while the variables MLTPL, RAT and SECT are 
negative and not significant.  
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The Firm’s performance4 is positively and significantly correlated with the age of the firm at 
the 1% level. This means that the older the companies are, the more their market share 
increases and the more their performance get better. The average age of companies in our 
sample varies between 9 and 10 years. This period allows firms to have more experience in 
negotiating the credit conditions and strengthen their position in the market. The oldest firms 
control better the market in which they take place and increase their market share and 
improve their performance. 
The size has a significant and a positive effect on the performance. Broadly, large enterprises 
are often more efficient than small and medium size enterprises (SMEs). This is due to their 
position in the market and their ability to give the necessary guarantees in obtaining credit 
(Mitchell and Rajan 1994). However, this conclusion seems to be in contradiction with our 
finding since most companies of our sample are SMEs. This leads us to conclude that despite 
the small size of firms, results indicate a positive and a significant relationship between the 
firm’s size and the performance. Regarding the variables reflecting the sector (SECT) and the 
credit rationing (RAT), their effects are not significant.  
According to the results, only the variable “Cost” affects negatively and significantly the 
performance of the Tunisian firms. This means that the cost of credit decreases the 
performance. This negative relationship is justified by the importance of financial charges 
during the contract. Generally speaking, small companies suffer from high financing costs 
because of the lack of experience and reputation. Banks do not trust on start-up, they apply a 
high interest rate which may enhance the cost of credit and consequently decrease the 
performance of the firms (Degryse and Van Cayseele. 2000). The duration of the bank-
enterprise relationship becomes a sine qua none condition allowing firms to access to finance 
at low costs and consequently contributes to increase their welfare. 
In conclusion, we can opine that the cost of credit decreases the performance of Tunisian 
firms while the size, age and duration of banking relationship improve the profitability. These 
results allow us to accept the hypothesis H1: the duration of the bank relationship improves 
the firm’s performance. 
                                                          
4
 In the rest of the paper we will analyze only the ROA as a measure of performance and profitability because it 
provides more meaningful results.  
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IV. Conclusion 
The lack of extensive theoretical and empirical literature analyzing the duration of the bank 
lending contract and its effects on the performance of firms motivate us to investigate the 
nature of this relationship for the Tunisian context. Our sample cover 100 companies 
observed over the period 2000-2007. We used an econometric model based on panel data 
with fixed effect regression. Our results showed positive and significant correlation between 
the duration, the age and the size with the performance of the firms (ROA).  The Variables 
NBANK and COST act in a negative and significant way whereas the effects of variables 
MLTPL, RAT and SECT are not significant.  As for the effects of the duration DUR on the 
performance of the companies, our results show a positive and a significant correlation.  The 
number of banks exerts a negative and a significant effect on the firm performance (ROA) 
whereas it has a positive and a non significant consequence if we retain ROE as the measure 
of financial profitability. The feeble bank relationships
5
 of the Tunisian companies and the 
orientation towards the exclusive and long term relationship support their performances and 
improve their profitability.  To conclude, we opine that the main benefits of the long term 
relationship for Tunisian firms are the guaranty of the good conditions of credit in terms of 
costs and availability and the improvement of their performance.   
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